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LAW SCHOOL: A MORTUARY FOR POETS
AND MORAL REASON
DAVID R. CuLP*
The study of law will train you for many different fields, but it will
not train you to embark upon one endeavor: It will not equip you
to become a poet.
At Columbia University Law School on an oppressively hot
August day, Professor Jack Kernochan greeted approximately 150
first year students in his Legal Methods section with the state-
ment quoted above. In doing so he struck upon a subject which
has received little attention: the extent to which legal training
represses or increases an individual's creative powers. This arti-
cle partially focuses on that subject, on the effect legal education
has on the ability to think and write creatively, not only as a poet
and novelist but as an attorney serving her' clients. It is, of
course, not suggested that the purpose of the law school is to turn
out poets, but to the extent that the article touches upon whether
law schools are graduating rigid technicians, or attorneys who
bring a measure of creativeness to the solution of their clients'
problems, it focuses upon a proper subject of legal education. A
major thrust of this article, however, has a broader vision, focus-
ing on how we, as attorneys, become indoctrinated into the "legal
culture" and the effect of that assimilation on our personalities
and our sense of morality.
In the 1970s Duncan Kennedy and Paul Savoy2 were two of
the principle legal scholars that led attacks on legal education,
noting the stifling effect of the Socratic method and the psycholog-
ical toll it takes on students.3 Students shared in the assault.
* B.S. 1964, University of Kansas; J.D. 1969, University of Kansas School of
Law; LL.M. 1975, Columbia University. Mr. Culp is an assistant professor and
director of the pre-law program at LaSalle University. He is also a member of
Berry and Culp, P.C., located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. Unless "his" or "her" refer to a specific person, the use of "his" or "her" is
meant to refer to both sexes.
2. Professor Kennedy is a Professor of Law at Harvard University, and
Professor Savoy is a Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
3. See Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV.
L. & SocIAL ACTION 71, 85 (1970); and Paul N. Savoy, Toward a New Politics of
Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 460, 484 (1970).
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Robert Stevens, in a study conducted in 50 interviews with the
Yale class of 1972, summarized some of his findings:
[S]tudents who seem to obtain positive reinforcement of their
classroom performances from professors appeared to some of their
peers to have done so by mechanical learning alone. Imagination
and creativity, supreme achievements by most educational stan-
dards, seem to have been demoted in favor of attaining legal
tools.
4
Five of 50 respondents interviewed after their first ten weeks of
law study objected to the traditional method of teaching in law
school based on its failure to encourage creativity. Stevens notes:
"Perhaps this feeling of lost creativity wanes in later semesters;
but the reaction after ten weeks of law school is significant."5
Student attacks on the law school have more often focused on
the abuses of the Socratic method and the effect of legal training
on the students' personal lives and relationships with people
outside their chosen profession 6 than it has lost on creativity. For
example, Sonia Mentchifoff, law professor and dean, advised
wives of first-year male law students that their husbands' person-
alities will become "more aggressive, more hostile, more precise,
more impatient."7
Although writers have more often focused on the effect of
legal training and the Socratic method on the students' personal
lives, other observers of the law school experience, in addition to
Stevens and his studies, have noted the lack of creativity in the
study of law.' Thus, in a study done in 1975-76, students report-
4. Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 561, 610-
11 (1973).
5. Id. at 640.
6. See Anthony J. Mohr and Kathyrn J. Rodgers, Legal Education: Some
Student Reflections, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403, 405 (1973). Among comments made
by students in the Mohr & Rodgers article are the following. One student talked
about the way law school has changed his interactions with others, that when he
listens to people he picks out the major flaws. "I listen to people I've known since
I was a child, and yet it is with a completely different set of eardrums.. .You
become impersonal; I'm very troubled by it." Id. at 413.
Another stated: "I see people now who knew me when I was in college. They
don't know me anymore! My mind has changed. I find myself in a conversation
picking out the facts and if they don't hang together, I ask the probing questions
that slice up somebody's psyche." Id. at 413.
7. Audrey J. Schwartz, Law, Lawyers and Law School: Perspectives from the
First Year Class, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437 (1980).
8. "A law student at the University of Wisconsin, after a series of in-depth
interviews with first year law students, tentatively concluded that the 'century
[Vol. 16:61
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ing on their law school experience stated that "they were more
articulate, smoked more; but felt they had lost some of their spon-
taneous common-sense; and were less creative."9 Some have
asserted that the Socratic approach and the case method exalts
"criticism over imagination."10 And another has noted that
"[i]mpressionistic studies of law school have identified a narrow-
ing of interests toward the analytic skills used by practitioners
and away from a broader concern with social values and creative
use of intelligence. " "
Despite the dearth of creativity in the study of law some have
noted that legal training appears not to have harmed an impres-
sive list of attorneys who have become men of letters, including
John Galsworthy, author of the Forsyte Saga and the recipient of
the Nobel Prize for literature in 1932. Two poets were Harvard
law graduates: James Russel Cornell, an 1840 graduate, wrote
poetry "in order to forget law which he could not stand,"' 2 and
Archibald Macleish, who graduated in 1919, practiced law for four
years, and has since won two Pulitzer Prizes for his poetry. Other
eminent writers include Erle Stanley Gardner, a practitioner in
Ventura, California and creator of Perry Mason; Arthur D.
Voekler, who was a justice of the Michigan Supreme Court for
three years and authored the murder mystery Anatomy of a Mur-
der under the pen name Robert Traver; and of more recent vin-
tage, John Osborn, Jr., the law student who wrote humorously
and chillingly of the perils of the Socratic method and competition
at Harvard Law School in Paper Chase, and Scott Turow who has
written two novels about the legal profession, Presumed Innocent
old method of legal instruction. . . causes unnecessary stress and
underachievement... [and that] testing procedures already employed deprive
the profession of creative, energetic and valuable personalities.'" Savoy, supra
note 3, at 444, n. 4 (citing Lawrence Silver, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law
School, Wis. L. REv. 1201, 1218 (1968)).
9. James B. Taylor, Law School Stress and the "Dformation Professionelle",
27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251, 259 (1976).
10. Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas A. Klegon, Socialization Effects of
Professional School, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 11, 14 (1978).
11. Thomas A. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of the
Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 338
(1981).
12. Lewis L. Laska, You Mean, He Was a Lawyer? 78 CASE & COM. 36, 40
(July-Aug. 1973).
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and The Burden of Proof, as well as a book, 1L, on his experiences
as a first-year student at Harvard Law School.'
At first blush, that the legal profession has cranked out a
number of good fiction writers does not seem surprising. Both the
attorney and the novelist rely on their ability with words and the
use of the English language for their livelihood. That some law-
yers become literary writers does not, however, provide much
insight into the question this article poses any more than a few
student criticisms offer an answer, and we turn hopeful to more
fruitful inquiry.
Researchers have adopted definitions of creativity which
include such terms as original, unique, novel, and imaginative.14
Under such definitions the response must at least be unusual, and
it should be appropriate to the situation.15 This definition is a
qualitative one, and it is not our purpose to study creativity by
making decisions on how imaginative the end "product" is; a focus
of this sort would raise more questions than can be answered. The
focus, instead, is on the process of creativity, on how creativity
takes place, on the conditions that foster it, and on the type of
personality that is more likely to be creative.
In defining the creative process, Maslow16 and other psycholo-
gists' 7 have distinguished between primary creativeness and sec-
ondary creativeness.'" Primary creativeness is the inspirational
stage, where the individual allows himself the freedom to think
wild thoughts, to fantasize, to let loose, and to be a little crazy.
This primary stage must be separated from the working out and
the development of the inspiration. This is so because the latter
phase stresses not only creativeness but also relies very much on
just plain hard work and discipline. The secondary kind of crea-
tiveness, the creativeness "which results in the actual products, in
the great paintings, the great novels, in the bridges, the new
inventions, and so on, rest as heavily on other virtues; stubborn-
13. For a more complete listing and many surprises, see Laska supra note 12.
14. See Robin Yeamans, Creativity and Legal Education, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC.
381 (1971).
15. JACOB W. GETZELS & PHILIP W. JACKSON, CREATVITY AND INTELLIGENCE -
EXPLORATIONS WITH GIFrED STUDENTS 128 (1962).
16. See ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE FARTHER REACHES OF HUMAN NATURE
(Stuart Miller ed., 1971).
17. See, e.g., ALEXANDER F. OSBORN, YOUR CREATIVE POWER, How To USE
IMAGINATION 92 (1940); GEORGE SHOUKSMITH, INTELLIGENCE, CREATIVITY AND
COGNrrrvE STYLE 104, 142 (1970).
18. MASLOW, supra note 16, at 59-60, 83, 86-89, 94.
[Vol. 16:61
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ness and patience and hard work and so on; as they do upon the
creativeness of the personality."19
In the primary stage, one needs to improvise on new insights
and, for a moment, not worry about what becomes of it, recogniz-
ing that many ideas will eventually be discarded. The primary
process is non-intellectual, non-judgmental. It is a letting go, a
fascination with the matter-in-hand, a getting lost in the present
and a detachment from time and place.2 ° It calls for one's total
attention and absorption. To the extent that one becomes self-con-
scious in a situation, one's capacity to think creatively becomes
stifled. For this reason, small children are generally much more
creative than adults; they are more natural, more playful and less
critically aware of themselves. 2 "This kind of creativeness is
[that which] any healthy child had which is then lost by most peo-
ple as they grow up."22 Most people as they grow older give up
their poetry, their flights into imagination and drown all healthy
childness. Although this maturity leads to what we call a "good
adjustment," and what has been described as getting along well in
the world- being realistic, having common sense, and taking on
responsibility, certain aspects of these adjustments involve a turn-
ing one's back on other parts of the personality, such as emotion,
fantasy, and childishness, which heighten creativity.23
In the primary stages of creativity, one must be capable of
brainstorming and entertaining wild thoughts. Every really new
idea looks crazy at first. Similar to a child, one must allow oneself
the freedom to be unrealistic, undisciplined, unscientific, specula-
tive, and uncritical. There must be an ability to play with ideas,
a "resistance to idea reduction."24 Judgment and rules of logic are
not applied at this time. Osborn's theory concerning creative
problem solving placed imagination above judgment and
encouraged free associationn of ideas.25 If you attempt to become
rational and controlled and orderly in the first stage, you will
never be creative. You must be capable of free association, of let-
ting ideas "come out on the table, in profusion, and then only later
19. Id. at 60.
20. Id. at 61-62.
21. See, e.g, VIKTOR LOWENFELD & W. LAMBERT BmTAiN, CREATIVE AND
M.ENTAL GROWTH, 187-88, 216 (6th ed. 1975); MASLOw, supra note 16, at 64.
22. MASLOw, supra note 16, at 94.
23. Id. at 86.
24. CREATIVITY: PROGRESS AND PoTENTLAL 22 (Calvin W. Taylor ed.,
1964)[hereinafter CREATIvITY].
25. See generally OSBORN, supra note 17, at 92.
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on, tossing away those ideas which ar bad, or useless, and retain-
ing the ones which are good. If you are afraid of making this kind
of crazy mistake, then you'll never get any of the bright ideas
either."2" Maslow describes the primary processes as very, very
different from the laws of common sense, good logic, of what the
psychologist calls the 'secondary processes,' in which we are logi-
cal sensible and realistic."2 7
With its emphasis on rationality, logic, and critical analysis,
legal training closely approximates a description of the secondary
process of creativity. It does not approximate the primary process.
I do not know of a law school class that allows such flights into
free association, into bringing forth all the ideas on the table
before subjecting them to critical analysis. In legal training the
critical analysis starts immediately, and the imagination is not
allowed time to roam. Psychologists have noted the clash between
the judicial mood and the creative.28 Unless properly coordinated,
each mars the working of the other. The tendency, however, is to
criticize too soon, thus seriously threatening creative effort. 29
Lowenfeld believes that "adults, because of their critical aware-
ness toward their imaginative activity, generally lose their crea-
tive ability."3 0
The dichotomy between critical thinking and primary creative
thinking is noted by Osborn. "[T]he mood for judicial thinking is
largely negative. 'What's wrong with this?. . . No, that won't
work.' "3  In contrast, the primary process of creativity calls for a
more positive attitude. Experiments have been conducted which
show that a positive or "constructive attitude" toward prior infor-
mation compared with a "critical" attitude toward prior informa-
tion compared with a "critical" attitude produced solutions, on
both related and unrelated problems, which were rated signifi-
cantly more creative.3 2
26. MASLOw, supra note 16, at 94.
27. Id. at 86-87.
28. OSBORN, supra note 17, at 91.
29. Id. at 88, 90.
30. LowENFELD & BlrrrAIN, supra note 21, at 188.
31. OSBORN, supra note 17, at 91.
32. CREATrvrrY, supra note 24, at 125. Taylor also discusses the experiments
that Torrance and his associates have conducted at the University of Minnesota.
The researchers concluded that "students who read research articles creatively
excelled those who read research articles critically, in the quality of their original
projects and in their ability to make creative applications of the subject matter of
the course." Id. at 124.
[Vol. 16:61
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Nowhere is this critical, negative attitude more prevalent
than in a law school classroom. Most law students develop a
reluctance to place their ideas before the class until they have
very cautiously and carefully already considered as many counter-
arguments and possible qualifications as they can. They fear the
risk of subjecting their ideas to the ridicule and critical analysis of
their peers and their professor. 3 Relying too much on reasoning
and attempts at perfection also results in caution among law
professors and may cause atrophy of creativity as well. Stone
claims a "startling lack of productivity [among law professors] if
one measures productivity by quantum of written work ... they
almost all suffer from an occupational malaise. They have inter-
nalized a legal standard of perfection which requires that they
anticipate every possible counterargument before they advance a
positive thesis of any sort."3 4 This norm discourages innovation
which risks provoking criticism and produces an intensely con-
servative atmosphere.35
Former Harvard Law Dean Griswold mirrors Stone's analy-
sis, arguing that, as a result of legal training, excessive thorough-
ness becomes a fetish: "[i]n its impact on professors it leads to the
legal academic disease which involves excessive caution, with
resulting inability to bring things to a conclusion for fear that
there might be some error in detail, which in much academic
thinking has become the deadly sin."36 Stone and Griswold were
not addressing themselves to the effect this norm of perfectionism
has on creativity. Is there an effect?
Gifted fiction writers are not necessarily any more productive
than the gifted law professor. Joseph Heller, author of Catch 22,
waited 13 years to publish his second novel, Something Happened.
33. See Glenn Stover, Kennedy's Classroom a Model of Humanized Legal
Education, HARvARD LAw REc., Dec. 1, 1972, at 8. Stover talks about the
hostility at Harvard and the fear "of venturing an incompletely formed thought.
Id. at 8. He states that students are afraid of taking risks due to "the rapier-like
criticism that is expected to follow student rejoiners" on class questions. Id. at 9.
This atmosphere conveys to students "that they are unworthy to make comment
without elaborate equivocation. It leads to the frequently heard and carefully
constructed 'on the one hand,... on the other hand arguments. It also leads to
the disastrous drop-out and freeze-up of large segments of students who do not
care to put their ideas under the knife." Id.
34. Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REV. 392, 403
(1971); accord Kennedy, supra note 3, at 88.
35. Stone, supra note 34, at 404.
36. Erwin N. Griswold, Intellect and Spirit, 81 HARv. L. REv. 292, 299 (1967).
1994]
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In the interval, besides working on his novel, he wrote a play, We
Bombed in New Haven, which took two and one half years to
write. Even if Stone and Griswold are correct in their analysis,
and this author thinks to a large measure that they are, they have
not proven that the creative processes have atrophied along with
productivity. No attempt has been made to suggest that creativity
is based on superficial thinking.37 In one sense, attempts at thor-
oughness and perfection would be very beneficial in polishing and
honing the final product. It would be invaluable in the secondary
process of creativity.
Although this meticulous, painstaking care can be beneficial
in the secondary stage, it may inhibit the primary processes from
functioning. The intellectual cautiousness of attorneys described
by Stone and Griswold is partially a product, as they suggest, of
the fear of having their ideas subjected to the knife in class, and
for a similar reason Stone describes professors as cautious. This
dread of external evaluation by others in turn leads to a reserve in
taking intellectual risks. The ability to take risks and an internal
focus of evaluation are two characteristics which psychologists
find necessary for creative functioning.3 To the extent that the
Socratic method fosters external evaluation, 39 and legal training
causes one to be overly careful, to see all sides of the issues, to
leave no stone unturned in one's analysis, they may also inhibit
risk taking. Many professors using the Socratic method prefer to
remain neutral in class. So that students will develop their own
standards of judgment, every student's reply and question is
greeted with another question.40 And yet it is paradoxical that
the use of the Socratic method in this way, since the student's
ideas are subject to continuing critical analysis in class, may leave
the student with no standards, external or internal by which to
judge. They learn only that every idea can be qualified, every
statement refined. I am not suggesting that this is a poor tech-
nique or that it is unrealistic. I am suggesting that such a tech-
37. See CREATIviTY, supra note 24, at 21 ("Certainly in science, and perhaps
in other fields, it seems unlikely that creative or profound contributions will
come from superficial thinkers.").
38. See E. PAuL TORRANCE, GUIDING CREATIVE TALENT 143-44 (1962); CARL R.
ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON 353-54 (1961).
39. Savoy argues that the Socratic method does foster external evaluation and
states that the "roads to creativity" are "systematically dynamited in the
classroom." Savoy, supra note 3, at 467-68.
40. Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional
Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 13 (1963).
[Vol. 16:61
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nique leads to fear of external evaluation; even well thought out
answers are continually qualified, and this does not give the stu-
dent an internal evaluation system which she feels can be trusted.
Watson is one writer who questions a puristic use of the
Socratic method. He notes that little overt reward is given for
good performance by the use of this method: "Since most profes-
sional responses are questions, they are perceived as never ending
demands, and hoped for relief never comes into sight. Such a
technique runs counter to all learning theory."41 Because the stu-
dent receives little feedback during the first semester,42 he does
not understand how well he is functioning in law school, and he
can only sit and wait for the return of first semester exams. If his
grades are good he has been reinforced that his ideas have merit
also; he is one of the gifted few who understand the myriad work-
ing of the law. If his grades are mediocre, he loses a great deal of
self esteem and confidence, with a corresponding loss of trust in
the validity of his own ideas.43 For the student whose grades are
mediocre, he or she is highly likely to begin to phase out on the
law school experience and lose interest in the educational process,
since the process has not reinforced the student's worth in his cho-
sen professional field.
Creativity studies indicate that the grading and assessment
processes are not conducive to the formulation of new ideas. As
previously mentioned, external evaluation of one's work inhibits
the creative process. Torrance stresses that people need periods
in which they can learn without being evaluated. "External evalu-
ation is always a threat and creates a need for defensiveness, and
prevents some portion of the child's experiencing or sensing from
achieving full awareness. What is lost is the openness that is so
necessary to the production of new ideas." 4 Even though the law
41. Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological
Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CN. L. REV. 91, 123 (1968).
42. See Mohr & Rogers, supra, note 6, at 416. One student noted that "[i]n
law school the feedback comes at the end, and there is nothing you can correct.
For this reason I think the true function of grades is to aid firms in hiring. They
don't serve what I understand to be the educational notion of feedback."
43. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 76.
44. E. PAUL TORRANCE, EDUCATION AND THE CREATIVE POTENTIAL 57 (1963);
accord Ralph J. Hallman, Techniques of Creative Teaching 1 J. CREATIVE BEHAV.
325, 326 (1967). LOWENFELD & BmrAIN, supra note 21, at 216 ("Only the child
produces in a straightforward fashion, projecting this total personality into his
work without inhibitions. The adult usually wants to conform to certain
standards. These standards do not exist for the child. It is for this reason that
1994]
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school student is normally graded at the end of the semester, the
final examination is a pervasive threat and one not easily forgot-
ten. Students listen half-heartedly to their classmates and then
take notes furiously when the professor speaks, for fear they will
miss something that will find its way into an exam question. One
former student 45 who made straight A's in law school said he took
down virtually everything the teacher said on the theory that
what the teacher thinks is important will be important for exami-
nation purposes. Although he is obviously correct, this kind of
preoccupation is not conducive to generating ideas in the class-
room. Instead of thinking about the problem, the student's con-
cerns are elsewhere.
One answer might be that students do much of their thinking
about the material during their preparation for class, that they
generate their "new" ideas at that time. Although this statement
is partially correct, for the most part it is unrealistic: Students
may read the assignments for class, but except for the first semes-
ter, class preparation is not intensive. Most students are pleased
if they have read the material for class, let alone sat down and
really thought about the problems generated by the materials.
Equally unrealistic is the view that students learn more from
their classmates after class than in class, that much learning
takes place in "informal" bull sessions. Students seldom find time
for these informal sessions, and to the extent they do, the session
is generally involved in clarifying points made in class. 46 That
students may learn from these informal sessions is clear. That
the sessions are turned into intellectual flights concerned with
new approaches to the law, I think unlikely. The competitive
atmosphere of most law schools, even the smaller law schools, is
the child gives us a true picture of himself. The more the child becomes aware of
external standards, the less will his work directly reveal his personality.").
45. The student's name is John "Topper" Johntz, Jr. In four years at Harvard,
he made one "B" , and is the only student to have graduated from Kansas
University Law School with all "A's".
46. One student, Michael Sirkin, a 1972 Columbia Law graduate, offers a
different explanation:
On orientation day three years ago, the Dean said that most of what we would
learn would come from our fellow students. That was the last we heard of that.
In the first semester people helped each other. We talked about the law and
worked through cases together. But after the first set of grades appeared, all
people would do is fight to see who got the book first and hid it the longest. The
grades created an elitism and people began to weigh their own advantages.
Mohr & Rogers, supra note 6, at 420.
[Vol. 16:61
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intense,47 and students grub for grades as much in Poverty Law
as they do in Corporations and Federal Income Tax.48 The compe-
tition and the fear of the almighty evaluator, the grade, cripple
creative functioning in the classroom. At Yale, students believe
that the move to a credit-fail system in the first semester has less-
ened competition and had a beneficial effect in the classroom.
"Students . . . credited the elimination of first semester grades
with improving classroom atmosphere and allowing a freer
exchange of ideas among students."49
Grades and competition are closely, if not inseparably, inter-
related. Undue competition is at least partially, if not in the main,
the result of the premium placed on grades. To the extent that
grading systems discourage creativity, a competitive atmosphere
where one is consciously trying to outhustle another would also
lead to dampening the creative spirit. Both grading and competi-
tion are based on a common component: evaluation. As a result of
one study, Adams concluded "that the related variables of evalua-
tion and competition inhibit and are detrimental to the divergent
thinking necessary for creativity productivity."50 In his study,
tests of creative thinking were administered to ninth graders in a
Florida high school in three testing atmospheres: competitive;
noncompetitive; and a noncompetitive, openly receptive atmos-
phere. The latter group registered the highest performance, and
the competitive group, the poorest. 51 The researcher concluded
that "the competitive-evaluative atmosphere commonly found in
the classroom does not allow for flexibility in thinking but
requires rigidity and conformity toward right answers if approval
47. Kennedy describes the intensity of the law school experience as follows:
The Law School is intellectually stimulating. But when you have been
competing in dead earnest since the age of ten, submitting constantly to
your own fear of the teacher's disapproval,.., there is a point at which is
amount of intellectual interest will overcome your fear and revulsion at
the spectacle of the professor smiling quietly to himself as he prepares to
lay your guts out on the floor, yet once again, paternally. Withdrawal,
no matter how painful for one's carefully nurtured sense that one is 'a
success' is less difficult than to submit to another time.
Kennedy, supra note 3, at 80.
48. Savoy, supra note 3, at 486.
49. Stevens, supra note 4, at 673.
50. John C. Adams, Jr., The Relative Effects of Various Testing Atmospheres
on Spontaneous Flexibility, a Factor of Divergent Thinking, 2 J. CREATIVE BEHAV.
187, 188 (1968).
51. Id. Adams concluded that the differences in the performance of the three
groups was significant. Id.
19941
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and reward are to result."52 The intensity of competition present
in the conditions above are minute when compared to the competi-
tion in law school.5 3 The grueling three-year long fight for grades
and class ranking is more intense among the "better" students,
but no one in law school escapes unscathed from the competitive
atmosphere. "It seems safe to infer that if the small amount of
competition introduced in the research situation inhibited creativ-
ity, the overwhelmingly competitive atmosphere at many law
schools must utterly crush it out."54
In the law school context, Kennedy has echoed the argument
made by Adams, pointing out the similarities of pre-legal educa-
tion to the law school experience. Kennedy stated that an
increase in competitiveness has brought into focus a characteristic
of pre-legal education: "a terrific emphasis on convergent reason-
ing (what is the right answer to this question?) as opposed to a
divergent reasoning (how many right answers or valid approaches
can you think of for this question?)"5 5 In law school, the decline of
rote learning is of ambiguous value, since the emphasis shifts only
slightly. "(M)emorization is replaced by the investment of stag-
gering amounts of energy in the quest for the correct solution
which will satisfy the teacher, and in avoidance of the wrong
answer which will provoke argument of 'ice cold indifference."56
On balance, Kennedy argues that the change may be for the
worst. Savoy has described several games that are played by
professors and students in the name of the Socratic method, with
the result that many students stop playing in the second and third
year. Although Kennedy and Savoy wrote of the use of the
Socratic method in the early Seventies, law school teaching and
the use of the case method and Socratic technique remain essen-
tially the same today as it did in the Seventies or for that matter
as is did when it was first introduced at Harvard Law School in
1870.11 It is not my desire to argue that law school should be
taught in a different way. I am too old and too tired to be con-
52. Id. at 191-92.
53. Although the competitive atmosphere was experimentally imposed,
Adams speculated that this atmosphere most closely approached the one usually
found in the average classroom situation. Id. at 191.
54. Yeamans, supra note 14, at 391. This statement by Yeamans is an
inference he draws from Adam's study. Id.
55. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 79.
56. Id.
57. Sherry L. Hartwell & Steven Hartwell, Teaching Law: Some Things
Socrates Did Not Try, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1990); see Paul F. Teich, Research
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cerned with that question, and I suspect that law schools will be
using the case method and Socratic dialogue for the next millen-
nium. I desire only to describe the Socratic process.
One "popular pastime of professors that often passes for
Socratic dialogue is the game of 'Guess What I'm Thinking,' 5 " a
game similar to the search for "the correct solution." This descrip-
tion of the Socratic method presupposes a search for the correct
answer. To the extent that the teacher is not leading the students
down a predetermined path, this description is inaccurate. The
Socratic method takes many different forms, depending on the
professor using it, and it would be incorrect to accept totally one
particular description of the Socratic process. At times the law
classroom is a place where many different and competing ideas
are shared and argued, with little seeming attempt to converge
the thinking but merely to bring out as many ideas as possible
that bear on the issues. Nevertheless, students commonly answer
question by stating, "I think what you are driving at." While the
teacher did not always seem to be driving at any particular
answer, on many other occasions he did. Used in this way, the
Socratic method does lead to less flexibility in thinking. Also, to
the extent the student perceives the teacher as looking for a par-
ticular solution, then the result is the same, a stifling of divergent
thinking.
But competition and the Socratic method do not always pre-
suppose a search for one answer. Competition in a classroom
does, however, limit creative thinking in a different manner: it
inhibits creativity by causing a fear of external evaluation by
teachers and classmates, leading to less flexibility in thinking and
to conformity in thought. "[Clompetition implies winners or at
least that some will achieve in excess of others and n order to
determine winners or losers evaluation is necessary."59 In a com-
petitive atmosphere one continually wonders how well he is stack-
ing up against his colleagues. This analysis is not the same,
however, as stating that competition leads to a search for one
answer.
The "examination" itself is a noncreative endeavor for the stu-
dent. Law school examinations, except for the take-home, put stu-
dents in a pressure cooker. Too many law school examinations are
on American Law Teaching: Is there a Case Against the Case System? 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1986).
58. Savoy, supra note 3, at 459.
59. Adams, supra note 50, at 188.
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four-hour exams given in three hours. The student does not have
time to be creative, nor would she probably take the risk if she had
the time.6" The student writes furiously, regurgitating all of the
theories and maxims culled from the classroom. While through a
complicated fact situation the student must display the knowledge
to apply these theories, this is not much different from applying
math theorems to a new hypothetical. The creative person needs
time. She produces a large number of responses to problems and
continues to produce responses over a longer period than the
uncreative person.61 The process of generating alternatives would
continue for longer periods of time than is presently allowed dur-
ing law school examinations.
Most law teachers, in deciding the amount of time needed in
answering examination questions, no doubt consider how long it
would take to "play-back" the concepts brought out in class. As a
teacher, I certainly have often done this. But this approach penal-
izes those students who have thought about the problems
presented in the course and have their own input for solutions. In
a pressure examination, they simply will never have the time to
relate their own ideas. When I was a second year law student in
1968, one of my classmates failed to complete more than one-half
of a Constitutional Law final examination because he simply had
so much to say about the issues presented by the course in great
depth. I spoke to our law professor, who stated that he felt com-
pelled to give my friend and colleague at least a "B" for the course
simply because the questions he had answered had been so beauti-
fully thought out.
I applaud the verve of my law student friend and admire him
for charting his own course on the examination; he simply devel-
oped more responses on the issues than his colleagues. In failing,
however, to finish more than one-half the questions he ran the
risk of receiving a grade much worse than a "B." Unfortunately,
most students in a pressure examination will have to content
themselves with replaying the material presented in class. When
the teacher reads the examinations, his own ideas will be staring
back at him. While the exam may test those who know and under-
stand the material, it breeds sterility in answers. From that
60. See Yeamans, supra note 14, at 383.
61. Id.
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standpoint, the approach of a few teachers in recent years to give
non-pressure examinations and take-homes are laudatory.62
The law school affects creative functioning in other ways.
First year students have complained of the fear engendered by the
Socratic method. In Stevens' study of first year students at Yale
in 1970, 40 of the 50 interviewees noted that law school teaching
methods created classroom anxiety for themselves and others.63
Twenty students reported a high level of personal anxiety, charac-
terizing the classroom atmosphere as hostile, combative, and
tense. A number of law students at Yale and Columbia have
pointed to the psychological fear of being called on in class, "the
fear of being exposed as an intellectual weakling in from of a lot of
people you don't know."64 One student stated that the "Socratic
method basically amounts to teaching the principles of fear."65
Others have echoed the refrain of the fear and stress inherent
in the Socratic method. Professor James Taylor noted the general
agreement "that emotional stress is high in law school and espe-
cially during the first year."66 He added that students most often
"cite the 'Socratic method' as the major cause of student stress."67
One recent graduate of the University of Texas School of Law dis-
cussed the stress and fear inherent in the Socratic method: "In
class we were called upon to speak before more than 100 other
62. Professor W.I Jones at Columbia Law School has tried a novel approach
to examinations, which apparently has met with student praise. At the end of
one semester in his trade regulation course, Professor Jones handed out three
fact situations. He told the students this was essentially the final exam and that
they were to discuss the problems with others in the course. One student in his
course commented on the procedure:
So after reviewing a bunch of us met and talked over the questions for
several hours. I learned a tremendous amount from doing that, and
apparently it worked quite well. This procedure solves two problems. It
eliminates all the talk about cheating that allegedly occurs on take-
home exams, and at the same time it gives you a chance to communicate
with your fellow students in a very constructive manner. It is just too
bad this system is not used more often.
Mohr & Rodgers, supra note 6, at 420 (statement by Pamela McGuire, a 1973
Columbia Law School graduate).
63. Stevens, supra note 4, at 640.
64. Id. at 641. Over half the students at Yale characterized their emotional
reaction in their first year as "tense." Id. at 643.
65. Mohr & Rodgers, supra note 6, at 410 (comment by Clifton Leonhardt, a
1972 Harvard graduate).
66. CREATIVITY, supra note 24, at 253, 260.
67. Id. at 612.
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students" before the "professor's assaulting questions."6" She dis-
cusses her first day in Contracts class when the professor
"promptly identified his first victim."69 She learned that "the
Socratic method of teaching meant I would be driven into a corner
by my professors' endless questions in response to my black-letter
answers."
70
The Socratic method of teaching, with its endless questions
and never-ending demands, places the professors in charge as the
power-brokers. In that climate law professors "can be aggressive
with little possibility of counterattack," since "in contrast with the
adversary situation in a courtroom, the professor may carry on an
essentially one-sided battle, always able to be the ultimate judge
and decision-maker."71 Even defenders of Socratic teaching "con-
cede that the law faculty has 'almost total power' over the stu-
dents."72 This power is sometimes misused, as one law professor
has stated, noting that "as students and as professors we watch
the verbal violence that occurs in some classrooms."73
While great debates in legal journals over the use of the
Socratic method have criticized, delimited, and extolled the value
of the Socratic method, to the extent that fear is its byproduct, it
inhibits functioning of the creative processes. The absence of seri-
ous threat to the self and the ability to transcend self-conscious-
ness are necessary precursors for creative functioning.74 In the
anxious person adaptable cognitive processes tend to become more
inflexible; he becomes more strongly fixated upon habitual modes
of perception and thought.75 In one sense this detrimental effect
of the Socratic method on creativity is short-lived. The paralyzing
fear that many students feel in their first semester classes does
not last for most students. By the fifth semester of law school,
Stevens notes that almost 75% of the students feel relaxed in
68. Margaret F. Uhlig, The Making of a Lawyer, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 611, 611
(1988).
69. Id. at 611-12.
70. Id. at 612.
71. Barry B. Boyer & Roger C. Cramton, American Legal Education: An
Agenda for Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 283 (1973-74)
(quoting Watson, supra note 41, at 114.
72. Id. at 266.
73. Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure
Full Class Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147, 148 (1988).
74. MASLOW, supra note 16, at 61, 66; TORRANCE, supra note 38, at 143.
75. RICHARD S. CRUTCHFIELD, Conformity and Creative Thinking,
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO CREATIVE THINKING 123 (H. Gruber ed., 1964).
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class, as compared with only 12% of the students in the first
semester. 76 On the other hand, the cautiousness and critical judg-
ment a student learns to exercise before answering questions
remains an element in the classroom through all three years. In
its effects, this still paralyzes the creative process.
In teaching law students to exercise "critical judgment," to
"analyze," and to "think like an attorney," the law school process
not only affects creative functioning but indeed exacts a toll in a
different way. One of the dramatic effects of legal education is to
produce a division between thought and feeling.77 Kennedy has
described two kinds of law school students. One type ends his
first semester with distinctively mediocre grades, causing a loss in
self-confidence and a change in attitude. The student quickly
becomes a law school dropout, adopting a pose of total indifference
to the law school and waiting only for the day he or she can leave
school to tack up a shingle. The second type is the top quarter of
the class and is likely earning her spurs on law review. The stu-
dent's developing law school personality contains both a "public"
and "private" self. The public self is "controlled," "modulated,"
and "willing to banish fluid emotional response from his face-to-
face relations with a large part of the people he knows."78 As a
reaction he builds a "private" self as a counter-model. He sees
himself as having "a talent for creative writing," or "an instinctive
feel for music that would be incomprehensible to his classmates,"
or "perhaps an unprecedented warm and emotional family."7 9 The
two sides are diametrically opposed: The private side is emo-
tional, and the public side, controlled. Although Kennedy feels the
private side may often be as rich as the student perceives it to be,
he adds that polarizing the two leads to deformations in both
areas.
Law school, then, is a continual attempt to suppress one's
emotions, and this has an effect (and perhaps a profound effect) on
the development of the attorney's persona. In my own experience,
I am not familiar with many attorneys who I could comfortably
say possess both the public and private self that Kennedy
describes. Often, the "control" exercised in professional life, the
tendency to intellectualize everything, spills over into the private
76. Stevens, supra note 4, at 656.
77. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 76-79; Savoy, supra note 3, at 470-71;
Watson, supra note 40, at 13.
78. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 77.
79. Id. at 78.
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life as well. My wife and I are both attorneys, and on some occa-
sions, when we become heated and the tempers flare, one of us
will say to the other, "Don't cross-examine me!" Our legal training
to take data and construct examination questions, instead of just
listening, has filtered through to our private life. When I was still
a law student, I met a very outstanding trial attorney who laugh-
ingly told me that at the dinner table while his wife was talking to
him he would mentally make evidentiary objections to what she
was saying, noting, for example, what was admissible and inad-
missible hearsay.
That Kennedy has correctly described the underplaying of
emotions in legal education (and for that matter throughout the
legal profession) seems clear. In law school, "[p]ersonal values
and feelings are brought into rational discourse rather than
acknowledged." 0 Legal education, at least in the professional
role, leads to a highly controlled personality and distrust of feel-
ings. For example, the concept drummed into law students that
they must learn to "think like an attorney" is an attempt to
divorce emotion from logic. This fact has been noted by others.
Savoy writes: "Neither the legal tradition nor the liberal tempera-
ment, which feeds a large part of contemporary legal theory, has
been very hospitable to the life of feeling.""1 Education anchors a
dualistic vision of a man that forces the splitting and polarization
of "intellect" and "feeling.""2 To be rational and controlled and
objective is good; to be irrational, to lose your head, to be emotion-
ally involved or subjective is bad. 3
Lawyers and law students are especially resistant to efforts to
get them in touch with their feelings. In class, a student is openly
ridiculed for an emotional reaction to a case, instead of the profes-
sor's probing for the intellectual underpinnings that form the
basis for the student's strong, gut-level, soul-based reaction to the
case. "Most members of the law teaching profession today believe
that an emotional approach to the law is not appropriate." 4 I
would agree, with reservation, that an emotional approach to the
law is not appropriate. Law is an attempt at rationality, at logic
(whatever those terms may mean), but without doubt emotional
reactions in law school are camouflaged by an attempt to intellec-
80. Id.
81. Savoy, supra note 3, at 461.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 456.
84. Id. at 502.
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tualize rather than acknowledge them. An emotional response to
a case is verbalized through principles of logic; as such, the under-
lying basis for must of the law, its moral and emotional underpin-
nings, becomes distorted.
For example, the common law that developed in England and
continues to change is judge-made law, based on what judges
believed to be a "fair" or "moral" resolution of the cases before
them. But what is "fair" or "moral," or "just" to one judge may not
be "fair" or "just" to another, and the decisions inevitably rest on a
judge's value system and less on principles of "logical" thought.
For example, being "outraged," or "righteously indignant," or
"emotionally involved" is often based on one's innate sense of "fair-
ness." The reaction can certainly be "emotional," but this same
search for fairness and justice is what guided the judges in forging
the common law. And it continues to drive judges today. The
"judge" or individual may well be able to articulate "reasons" for
his/her "emotional" reaction to a given situation; in so doing, the
response would be a coordination of the emotion and the intellect.
And it seems to me that much of the underpinning of the law is a
marriage of the emotion and the intellect. For example, deeply
embedded in my legally-trained cranium is the adage, "Win the
case in equity and give the judge a peg to hang his hat on." This
statement, adopted by many of the same attorneys and professors
who ridicule "emotion," is a recognition of the need to appeal to a
judge's sense of "moral" outrage, to have him or her exclaim,
"Unfair!" Thus, as a law student, I was instructed that the attor-
ney needs to win the case on equitable principles and then give
the judge legal theories so that he has a "peg" to which to hang his
"emotional" or "value-laden" decision.
But the law school experience teaches students to ignore and
obscure the feeling side of life, to divorce emotion from logic, as if
they were incapable of peaceful coexistence. Students apparently
exalt over their learning to "think like a lawyer," as if it were some
special, select club and different from all other forms of rational
thought. Students undergoing the experience of legal education
often state that the most important skill learned in law school was
the "ability to think like a lawyer [and to] reason formally and
logically.., and unemotionally." 5 In contrast, one writer noted
that the
85. Willging & Dunn, supra note 11 at 335 (quoting Erlanger & Klegon, supra
note 10, at 30).
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concept and practice of "thinking like a lawyer" is one of the
ungraspable carrots that is continually dangled in front of stu-
dents. However, despite its status as one of the organizing princi-
ples of legal education, the teaching community has left the
concept remarkably underdeveloped. Could this be because
"thinking like a lawyer" is more myth than reality; because law-
yers - and this includes the judiciary-think as ... the rest of us;
and because the only difference is in the rationalization or obfus-
cation, not in the processes?"86
A glaring example of how thinking like an attorney is more
myth than reality, of how values and subjective thought are ratio-
nalized away by judges and attorneys and law professors in the
name of "analysis" is Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe
v. Wade, 7 in which the Supreme Court held that women have a
Constitutionally protected right of privacy that, in essence, allows
pregnant mothers to abort a "fetus"88 during the first two trimes-
ters of pregnancy. 9 In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun tells his
audience that he will decide the case by resorting to "thinking like
an attorney." Thus, he writes:
One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw
edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes
toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards
one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and
to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion... Our task,
of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement,
free of emotion and predilection.90
That sounds simply marvelous, but of course it means noth-
ing, and Justice Blackmun decided Roe v. Wade not by logically
and objectively "thinking like an attorney" but by calling into play
his value system and his emotional and subjective base. For
example, in the opinion Justice Blackmun holds that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right which can only be infringed upon
86. Richard F. Devlin, Legal Education As Political Consciousness - Raising
or Paving the Road to Hell, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 213, 216 n. 18 (1989).
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 ("She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus"). In
my opinion, Justice Blackmun uses the word "fetus" throughout his analysis in
an attempt to gain support for his decision and to mask the emotion involved, as
the word "fetus" has an impersonal tone in comparison with discussing the
abortion of "life."
89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (summary of the holding).
90. Id. at 116.
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by a "compelling state interest."91 All well and good, but then Jus-
tice Blackmun and his judicial brethren in the majority hold that
there is a "compelling state interest" to protect the "fetus" in the
third trimester, since at that point the "fetus," or child, or baby, is
viable and can live outside the mother's womb.9 s But was the case
decided on Constitutional analysis, "free of emotion and predilec-
tion"? Of course not. It would have been just as "constitutionally-
correct" for the Court to hold that the state has a "compelling state
interest" at the moment of conception,93 since at that point human
life begins and the embryo has all the genetic characteristics he or
she will ever have.
In regard to Justice Blackmun's "viability" argument (that
there is a compelling state interest only when the fetus can live
outside the mother's womb), the fact is that a seven month old
fetus, or for that matter, a new-born or a one year old, can live
outside the mother only with the aid of others. Just as a two-
month old fetus need the nourishment from the mother to survive,
similarly a fetus in the last trimester can survive outside the
mother's womb only with the aid of others. The child will not be
feeding himself or hunting wild game for his meals. Thus, the
growth process is continual, from the moment of conception until
adulthood. And Justice Blackmun could just have easily held that
the state has a compelling state interest at that moment of concep-
tion, because that is the point at which human life begins and the
rest is merely the maturation and growth of that tiny creature
until adulthood. My point is not to argue whether Roe v. Wade
91. Id. at 155.
92. Id. at 163 ("[Tihe fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb[.]").
93. Justice Blackmun makes the absolutely absurd argument that no one, not
theologians nor doctors, can agree as to when life begins, that "conception" is a
process over time. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. He then argues that the morning after
pill proves his point. Id. at 161. But of course the morning after pill is
unnecessary unless one is pregnant and life has begun. The point of the morning
after pill is to kill the fertilized egg. Justice Blackmun mischaracterizes his
argument. We know that life begins at the moment of conception, as at that
point that tiny organism has all the genetic characteristics he or she will ever
have. It is not "conception" that is a process over time, but maturation and
growth. "Conception" is the moment in time when we say the woman is
"pregnant," if she is not carrying "life" at that point, what is she carrying,
something "dead"? It is maturation and growth that takes place over time, from
the moment of conception through birth to adulthood; that whole continuum is a
matter of maturation and growth, but to say that we do not know when life
begins seems to be an ingenious argument designed to mask and obscure.
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was wrongly or rightly decided, but only that Justice Blackmun
and his brethren made their decision based on their value systems
and their subjective and emotional reactions to abortion. "Think-
ing like an attorney" had little to do with the decision.
And yet attorneys invariably pride themselves on the ability
to divorce logic from emotion and to "think like an attorney."
While observers of the law school and professional experience
have noted this gulf or polarization that occurs between logic and
feeling in law, Watson explains why the polarization takes
place.9 The typical first year law student plunges zealously into
learning about the law. He eagerly prepares for class, usually
studying long and arduously. In class, however, "regardless of
how well he presents his material, the teacher will inevitably ask
more questions that either directly or by implication indicates
that he does not understand the case."95 Even for a student who
has done an excellent job of dealing with the questions put to her,
she has little tangible evidence of this fact. Though it takes some
time to make full impact, the students become progressively con-
fused and panicked by their awareness that they do not know
what is being demanded of them nor how to meet the pressure. As
a result of the anxiety produced by this process, students are
forced to make some kind of psychological defense adjustment to
avoid and diminish ongoing pain.9 6
The anxiety-muting defensive maneuvers, instead of settling on
the specific stress situations of the classroom, will be generalized
progressively to block emotional awareness. Many law students
will progressively surround themselves with a suit of armor that
makes them more and more impervious to emotional aspects of
most, if not all, situations.97
Watson is describing one factor that leads to the emotionally
depleting law school experience: the continuous and powerful
motivation for erecting psychological defenses as a result of the
extensive use of the case method, with its attendant pressures.
Kennedy and Savoy describe, as a second factor, the traditional
approach in legal instruction to exalt rationality and stifle emo-
tional feelings.
This gulf between "feeling" and "logic" not only permeates the
law school and professional experience, this constriction in the
94. Watson, supra note 40 at 13.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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range of emotional experience and a resulting over-intellectualiza-
tion are also negatively related to the processes of creativity.98
Studies of creative people have shown them to be more open than
most to the whole range of experience, to their feelings and emo-
tions; they tend to be more intuitive, more feeling than thinking.99
This does not comport with the law school (or professional)
experience.
Stone appears to accept the premise of Kennedy and Savoy
that legal education divides rationality and emotion. He answers
by explaining that the same criticism has been levelled at the
medical profession; ° ° his own observations of current graduate
school socialization experiences suggest to him "that Kennedy and
Savoy have been too ready to accept phenomenon as unique to
legal education which are in fact fairly general."101 We can fur-
ther expand Stone's analysis: The phenomena is not only common
in other graduate school programs but is part and parcel of our
whole educational system. A.S. Neill, author of Summerhill,
indicts most educational systems: "Such an education almost
surely ignores the emotions of life. Only the head is educated. " 10 2
Another leading educator, John Holt, adds that public educa-
tion in the United States stifles the creative capacity of chil-
dren.10 3 In fact, Torrance states that "many of the children who
stand out as highly creative in the second and third grades, espe-
cially boys, will not be highly creative as fourth graders."0 4 Many
highly creative children will simply never survive to be creative
adults. From kindergarten on, imagination and reason are held in
conflict with each other.10 5 While many experiences of the child
may lead to a retardation of his creative powers, including his
peer relationships outside the classroom and his interaction with
his immediate family, the educational process adds to the toll.
98. See TORRANCE supra note 38, at 66-67, 82; CRUTCHFIELD, supra note 75, at
125.
99. See FRANK X. BARRON, I.Q., PERSONALITY AND ORIGINALITY 241 (1963)
(Barron's description of the creative writer).
100. Stone, supra note 34, at 422-23.
101. Id. at 425.
102. ALEXANDER SUTHERLAND NEILL, SuMmERHILL: A RADICAL APPROACH TO
CHILD REARING 100 (1960).
103. See JOHN HOLT, How CHILDREN FAIL 208 (1964).
104. TORRANCE, supra note 38, at 76.
105. Id.; accord Savoy, supra note 3, at 461. Savoy believes our educational
systems split "intellect" and "feeling" and encourage people to experience life in
substantially the same way as everyone else.
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But legal education is not just one more brick that walls off crea-
tivity. In law's heightened sensitivity to rational thought and rig-
ors of logic, and corresponding insensitivity to emotions, its costs
are likely greater.
A separate question that may be asked is whether in the
study of law emotion and logic should be integrated. The question
is how much emotion a lawyer can handle optimally while per-
forming her professional work objectively and efficiently. One
recent graduate, for example, has stated that in law school, "I
learned that it would be my responsibility to represent my clients
zealously, whether or not I believed they were right... and real-
ized it was not my job to judge."106 While I do not necessarily
agree with the student's assessment, in that we are not just hired
guns and whores, 10 7 perhaps lawyers and doctors, as well as some
other professionals, need a certain amount of psychological armor-
ing.1°s However, as Watson writes: "[i]t seems clear... that we
have gone too far in the armoring process. Whatever the ideal bal-
ance may be, we can surely develop a greater sensitivity for emo-
tional problems than is being encouraged and utilized in
contemporary law students."10 9 Moreover, whether or not there
should be greater integration of the emotion and the intellect in
law school, the allure to integrate is detrimental to creative
functioning.
Not every facet of a legal education, however, is harmful to
creative functioning. Hopefully, three years of legal training
make one more verbally fluent with an increased ability to concep-
tualize, both of which are affirmatively linked to creativity. 1°
The creative person has also been described as possessing a desire
to excel, having determination, being energetic, industrious, thor-
ough, and unwilling to accept anything on a mere say-so. 1 Three
years of law school surely make one more thorough and question-
ing than before he or she entered, and the other characteristics
named would seem to describe most lawyers. Thus, in one aspect
106. Uhlig, supra note 68, at 616.
107. One attorney I have litigated against one day said that as attorneys "we
are all whores." To the extent that other attorneys also feel this way, it is a sad
commentary on our profession.
108. Watson, supra note 41, at 218, 241.
109. Watson, supra note 40, at 14.
110. See BARRON, supra note 99, at 218, 241.
111. CREATrVrry, supra note 24, at 20; see also TORRANCE, supra note 38, at 66-
67.
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law school makes the student more perceptive than before. He or
she certainly sees with different glasses.
This different perception and increased awareness may be
helpful in one sense; a creative writer or poet is one who perceives
things more sharply than the average person. Yet the difference
between the creative writer and the attorney is that the creative
writer perceives with a total awareness, while the attorney wears
blinders. One aspect of the attorney's personality, the rational,
logical part, becomes sharply sensitized, while he becomes blinded
to a second part of his awareness, his emotional sensitivity. In
some ways the attorney is more perceptive, in other ways, less.
Legal training would be of greatest help to creative functioning in
the second stage of creativity, where the emphasis is on critical
evaluation, determination and thoroughness. Legal education, for
the most part, is not conducive to the primary stage of creative-
ness. The competition and grading systems, the focus on an exter-
nal evaluation system, the constant critical evaluation in law
school, and the tendency to divorce thought from feeling all are
inconsistent with the proper functioning of the "idea stage" of cre-
ativity. The short three years of law school is a noncreative
experience.
The implication of the arguments that have so far been made
is that people are less creative after three years of law school that
when they first heard the law dean's welcoming speech to their
freshman class. It could very well be that law school actually has
little effect on the creative potential or personality of the person
entering law school, that those who choose law as a profession are
not usually very creative people. In one study on creativity, it was
found that the lowest risk scores among college sophomores at the
University of Delaware were those who were undecided about
their vocational choice;112 the researcher concluded that indeci-
sion and risk-taking involves making decisions on the basis of
inadequate and incomplete information. 113 Since risk-taking is
one aspect of creativity, implied in the results of the study is that
those students who are unable to make vocational choices may be
less creative. Law school for many is a means of keeping career
options open and "attracts many who are still undecided about
their vocation. " 114 That law school for many is a means of avoid-
112. See TORRANCE, supra note 38, at 75.
113. Id.
114. Stone, supra note 34, at 392, 400. Edward Levi and David Reisman have
characterized law as a "career for the uncommitted." It is a career that preserves
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ing a decision about a vocation has been documented in studies
comparing law and medical students: "Law students generally
decide on their career later, have more ambiguous role models,
and are much less sure even when they reach law school that they
will in fact become lawyers."115 The correlation between the study
of creativity and the law student personality is tentative, but may
offer some insight.
Other studies have shown that the noncreative person is
"more anxious, insistent on securing a safe and stable environ-
ment, desirous of avoiding ambiguity and uncertainty at any
cost."1 16 Those persons having higher originality appear to feel
less need for discipline and orderliness." 7 By contrast, Watson, in
discussing the psychodynamics of legal education, has found
among law students a greater than average need for order and
security, a factor which plays a critical role in their functioning
both in the academic environment and later in their professional
lives."' Additionally, at least two legal scholars believe that law
students develop an intolerance for ambiguity and are afflicted
with indecision and self-doubt.119
Studies have been made of the vocational choices of creative
people. In studies of adolescents 62% of the group listed as crea-
tive chose such unconventional occupations as adventurer, inven-
tor, writer and the like. 120 Only 16% of the highly intelligent but
noncreative people chose such professions, while 84% of the latter
group "chose 'conventional' occupations, such as doctor, lawyer,
engineer. " 1 2 1 Whether the students eventually went into the pro-
fession they named is unknown. A separate study showed differ-
ent results. A finding obtained in a study of graduate students
options rather than requiring them to be taken up. David Reisman, Observations
on Legal Education, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 63, 65 (1968).
115. Stone, supra note 34, at 400.
116. CRUTCHlIELD, supra note 75, at 135.
117. ROGERS, supra note 38; see also, e.g., TORRANCE, supra note 38, at 66-68.
118. Watson, supra note 41 at 101. Stone has further expanded on the identity
problems of law students. He states the one unfortunate aspect of traditional
Socratic teaching is its reliance on challenging the value system and moral
assumptions with which students approach the law. This approach "is seen as a
serious threat to convictions which are central to the students' personal identity."
With the student's occupational identity unresolved and his values attacked by
the professor, the result is a loss of security. Stone, supra note 34 at 415.
119. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 75; see also Savoy, supra note 3, at 484.
120. See TORRANCE, supra note 38, at 54-61 (citing Getzels and Jackson studies
from 1958-61).
121. See generally id.
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and repeatedly confirmed in investigations of other groups showed
that individuals who rated high on "originality" reveal a charac-
teristic pattern of scores on the Strong Vocation Interest Blank. 122
The more original subjects, with slight variations from sample to
sample, rate high on such scales as architect, psychologist, author-
journalist, and specialization level;123 and low scores on such
scales as purchasing agent, office person, banker, farmer, carpen-
ter, veterinarian policeman and mortician. 124 MacKinnon inter-
prets these findings as indicating that creative individuals are
less interested in small details and the practical and concrete
aspects of life, and more concerned with meaning, implications
and symbolic equivalents of things and ideas.1 25 The highest val-
ues stressed by all the highly creative groups are the theoretical
and aesthetic scales.
What all this means is impossible to determine without stud-
ies directed specifically at attorneys. One study directed to attor-
neys provides evidence, however, suggesting that people prone to
intellectualizing approaches are drawn in disproportionate num-
bers to legal study, and once in law school are least likely to drop
out; of the "thinking" types, 11 per cent dropped out compared to
20 per cent of the "feeling" types. What this means in terms of
creativity is not entirely clear, and whether one who enters law
school is necessarily less creative than other groups remains
unknown. On the one hand, attorneys seem less interested in the
practical and concrete aspects of life and more concerned with the
abstract world of concepts, ideas and values. By the same token,
attorneys seem much more creative than bankers and farmers
and generally less creative than architects. Although some legal
scholars have stressed the need of law students for order and
security, what quantitative effect these traits have on a creative
functioning is impossible to determine. A further problem is that
psychologists are not in full agreement on the necessary factors in
the personality that enhance creativity. In fact, Shouksmith sug-
gests that, just as creative products may differ in level and in
kind, "so may different personalities be regarded as being poten-
122. The study was conducted by MacKinnon in 1960 at the California
Institute for Personal Assessment and Research; the study is discussed in
ToRRANcE, supra note 38, at 68.
123. Id. The term "specialization level" was not defined.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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tially creative in different ways and in different situations. 12
Although the results of one study indicate that entering law stu-
dents are much more aggressive people than found in other pro-
fessions, 127 no study has been done to gauge the creative abilities
of the entering law student, and not even tentative conclusions
can be drawn. Whatever can be gleaned from the studies and
arguments by others listed above will have to be done by the
reader alone. I offer no conclusions in such tenuous territory.
Just as law students generally may be more aggressive than
other professional groups, entering law students may place
greater emphasis on rationality and logic than others, as one
study has suggested. 2 ' The importance the law places on these
intellectual processes may well be a prime motivating factor in the
student's decision to enter law school, and the student may there-
fore be more likely to divorce emotion from thought than the aver-
age person, even without law school instruction. The law school
atmosphere and teaching, however, also force a sterile, clinical
approach to law. Legal education sharpens the mind by narrow-
ing it; "talents are turned toward relatively sterile approaches and
are impoverished by the demands of a particularly emotionally
depleting kind of success." 129 The over-emphasis on rationality in
law school makes it unique from any other graduate school experi-
ence or educational endeavor. 13 0 Listening to a good legal mind at
work is fascinating, as argument after argument is decimated in
the face of logical analysis; it is also cold and impersonal. In a
discussion of the effects of a law school education on the creative
processes, the analysis must be separated into two parts: whether
the law school graduate is imaginative and creative in his work as
an attorney and whether he is creative in the other aspects of his
life.
Even if law school is not a particularly creative experience,
and the attorney not a prime candidate to win the Pulitzer Prize
for literature, one can argue that attorneys, on the whole, use
imagination and creativity in their work and handling of their cli-
ent's problems. Griswold suggests this is not so, that again and
126. SHOUKSMITH, supra note 17, at 144; accord, CREATIVITY, supra note 24, at
28.
127. See Barbara Nachmann, Childhood Experience and Vocational Choice in
Law, Denistry and Social Work 7 J. COUNS. PSYCHOL. 243 (1960).
128. See Willging & Dunn, supra note 11, at 340-41.
129. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 85.
130. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 36, at 300.
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again logic is stressed in law school as the ultimate objective. 13 1
Imagination is encouraged in small ways and perhaps in analogi-
cal reasoning, but imagination is not encouraged "to devise new
premises, to start out on whole new lines of reasoning, to come up
with new solutions."'32
What is needed is a feeling that for once a piece of doctrine will be
challenged in a new direction rather than confronted the thou-
sandth time with some well known countervailing principle. The
law school classroom is strewn with the corpses of ideas that did
not succeed, of new approaches that no one took up.133
Although law exercises abortive flights into imagination and ana-
logical reasoning, the really novel idea is quickly and emphatically
shut down. Having been groomed for three years in a certain
approach to the law, the lawyer is unlikely suddenly to become
highly creative. Precedent and former doctrine guide much of the
lawyer's work. While making policy arguments and drawing dis-
tinctions between cases involves some exercise of imagination, the
exercise in many instances is more technical than highly imagina-
tive. Although in one study Carlin found that many lawyers
neither have nor feel the need for such creative skills, 3 4 a good
lawyer should be more than a technician applying the rigors of
logic and theories learned in law school.
Because of the complicated problems, value judgments, and
skills involved in the practice of law, Watson asserts a very high
order of creativity is essential. 13  Others have agreed with Wat-
son. For example, a recent analysis describes six standard goals
relating to legal instruction and the development of law students'
abilities, and one of the goals listed was "the ability to 'synthesize'
and build original legal theories, frameworks and systems."' 36
131. Id.
132. Id. at 301.
133. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 84.
134. See JEROME. E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 3 (1962). MacLeod
stresses the need for creative skills for attorneys:
Aside from the possibility, of course, that a "wild" idea could trigger a
practical one-even in law-in creative problem-solving, we strive for
the practical ideas, but permit.the "crazy" ideas for what they might
lead to ... the more ideas we have, the more likely we are to find the
best ones.
Gordon A. MacLeod, Creative Problem-Solving - For Lawyers?!, 16 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 198, 200 (1963).
135. Watson, supra note 40.
136. See Teich, supra note 57, at 167 n. 2.
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Watson has argued that to move toward solutions for the many
problems encountered in practice, the lawyer must have a "will-
ingness and capacity to cast off fixed notions temporarily because
they would limit the scope of his exploration and narrow the syn-
thesis of new information. He must be able to drift freely through
real and fantasied solutions to the problems, knowing in the end,
he can choose the best one and apply the tough logic of legal
reality."137
Every lawyer will receive opportunities to be an engineer on
many matters in his or her practice, and numerous lawyers will
also have a chance at some time during their careers, perhaps in a
period of public service, to try their hand at even more sweeping
flights of innovation, imagination and creativity. 138 As Toffler
notes in his book, Future Shock, 3 9 the increased rapidity with
which technical changes are occurring in our society is causing
corresponding changes and stresses in our social structures. As
our society changes more rapidly, the law will also be forced to
change; to keep pace, this will call for new approaches and solu-
tions to our legal problems and will tax the creative powers of
attorneys more than ever before.
On the whole, law schools may do a very good job of teaching
students about substantive areas of the law, but the schools have
done little to foster the blending of the students' emotions and
subjective values with the intellect. In a similar manner they
have done little to foster the development of morality or ethical
behavior,14° as can be gleaned from the graduate's statement that
in law school she learned she must represent her clients with zeal,
whether or not she believed they were right and that she "realized
it was not my job to judge."' 4 ' But such teaching and such learn-
ing means that attorneys can rationalize some very unethical
behavior, on the basis they never allow their emotions or values to
enter into representing a client, that we are just expensive "hired
guns." The concept that we are "hired guns" in intellectualization
to the extreme is a complete shutting down of one's own emotional
yardstick, one's value system and sense of morality. The view
137. Watson, supra note 40, at 5.
138. See Griswold, supra note 36, at 297.
139. ALvIN TOFFLER, FuTuRE SHOCK (1970).
140. The author intends to write a second article discussing in depth the extent
to which law school and the practice of law fosters or impedes one's moral and
ethical judgment and behavior.
141. See Uhlig, supra note 68, at 616.
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that we are "hired guns" and that if we want morality, we should
go down the street to the school of religion 142 is a disservice to the
profession and fosters unethical behavior. In addition, although
law schools may teach students to be rigid technicians, or "intel-
lectual plumbers" as one student called it, 143 law schools do not
foster the creative awareness of students.
Stone believes that a call to the side of creativity is displaced.
Stone refutes critics of traditional legal education who argue that
the law school should assist with the student's self-actualization
and proceed in an atmosphere of openness to the entire range of
human experience in order to allow creativity to flourish. 144 Stone
comments that the role of the teacher would become identical with
the role of the therapist, "allowing the student-patient to get in
touch with the wellsprings of creativity, his unconscious and
repressed emotion." 145 To perform this function properly, the
teacher would have to abandon her traditional authoritarian and
judgmental role, including her accouterments of testing and grad-
ing. This approach would ignore all the pedagogical advantages
and group control functions of the Socratic method; it gives exag-
gerated emphasis on creativity in law school. 146
Few law students, Stone explains, will achieve a sense of crea-
tivity during their first year at law school. Creativity cannot occur
until a student first masters the mass of information necessary to
inform his creative efforts. "Most of professional training, but its
very nature, demands the acquisition of large amounts of cogni-
tive data. This learning task is essential to professional compe-
tence and does not allow for instant creativity. " 147 Mastering a
series of legal cases can be an exciting intellectual challenge, but
this sort of learning cannot be a discovery of something unknown
to others nor can there be instantly creative experiences in this
process. "The realities of a generalist professional education are
142. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 265.
143. The former law student, a graduate in the top twenty percent of a well
respected East Coast law school, scathingly described law school as "power-
broking, ball-busting, humiliating, mind-twisting and in between that, people
were learning to put the pipes together. It had nothing to do with the pursuit of
the truth. It is a mean-spirited plumber's school."
144. See Stone, supra note 34, at 418-19.
145. Id. at 419.
146. See id. at 420.
147. Id. at 421.
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for most people incompatible with being creative; to suggest other-
wise is a cruel hoax."14 8
Radically changing the pedagogical approach will not alter
this fact. Stone's analysis that creativity cannot flourish in a field
such as law when one possesses only a superficial knowledge of
that field has ample support in research.149 In the second and
third years of law school, however, some changes in teaching
approach could promote the creative processes. For three years of
one's legal education, except for a few seminars and the entrance
of the clinical programs, law classes are taught in predominantly
the same manner. As Stone points out, the Socratic method has
many educational benefits, but not every course needs to be
taught by this method. Moreover, creativity can be fostered with-
out drastically altering the Socratic method.
The evidence indicates that lost creativity can be renewed, at
lease to some degree, at any age. Most studies show that "even
brief periods of training and the establishment of certain optimal
conditions in higher education can improve the quantity and qual-
ity of creative thinking."150 Just as originality can be improved, a
hostile environment threatens creativity, and law schools need to
become more cognizant of how teaching methods and law school
policies affect creative functioning. Removal of a grading system
in the first semester, as Yale has done, or a refusal to rank stu-
dents or to release grades to employers are methods some law
schools have adopted. These lessen the tremendous pressure in
law school, make for a more relaxed environment and facilitate
the freer exchange of ideas.
If creativity is to flourish, the law school would also have to
create an atmosphere that is more neutral, one that is openly
receptive to creative answers.' 5 ' Students in the classroom
should be encouraged to try out new approaches, to "think up ten-
tative solutions to problems at hand, make wild guesses, hitchhike
ideas, build on the ideas of others and point these ideas in new
directions."' 52 The attitude of the professor has a great bearing on
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., CREATITv, supra note 24, at 21. Taylor believes that in science
and perhaps in other fields it is unlikely that creativity or profound contributions
will come from superficial thinkers. Id.
150. Id. at 126. (citing studies by Mearns in 1941 and Osborn in 1957).
151. See Yeamans, supra note 14, at 385-86. Yeamans reports on studies
which indicate that subjects will not respond with creative answers to neutral
instructions. Id.
152. Hallman, supra note 44, at 328.
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whether students will take the intellectual risk of responding with
a novel idea. This is not a suggestion that law schools become less
intellectually rigorous, but at times, at least, the intellectual, criti-
cal analysis should be postponed until after the class has been
given freer reign to juggle improbably related events, to express
theories which appear to be ridiculous, and to speculate on the
basis of inconclusive information. 153 Although this approach
would not be used in every class period, at times it could be used
effectively.
One of the problems in studying a discipline like law is that in
becoming steeped in a field one also becomes steeped in the ideas
current in the field, and as a result, existing ideas tend to blind
creative insights.15 4 The suggested approach would be an attempt
to jog set patterns of thinking. The approach could be used con-
sistently with the Socratic method. As a starter, however, it
requires that teachers treat imaginative, unusual ideas with more
respect than is commonly allowed in many law classes. While
studying law, Franz Kafka, in a letter to his father, gave his
account of legal education: "(I)n the few months before the exams,
and in a way that told severely on my nerves, I was positively liv-
ing, in the intellectual sense, on sawdust, which had, moreover,
already been chewed for me in thousands of other people's
mouths."' 55 The suggested approach is an attempt to see law
through new lenses and not just from the bifocals of our past.
Another way to increase the creative potential of the law stu-
dent would be to experiment with either new teaching methods in
the second and third year or to change the emphasis on those
already utilized. Although one mark of the highly creative person
is her self-starting ability,15 6 law students are forced to rely on the
judgment of others. After the first year, students are allowed to
choose which courses they wish to take and the topics for papers
they will write, but the judgment for the curriculum, examina-
tions, and number of papers is left to the teacher. Torrance
writes: "It is quite possible that too much reliance is placed upon
153. Id.
154. MARY HENLE, The Birth and Death of Ideas, CoNTEMPoRARY APPROACHES
TO CREATIVE THINKING 43 (H. Gruber ed., 1964).
155. FRANz KAFKA, DEAREST FATHER: STORIES AND OTHER WRITINGS 181 (Ernst
Kaiser & Eithne Wilkins trans. 1954) (quoting letter from Franz Kafka to his
father, November, 1919).
156. E. PAUL TORRANCE, ROLE OF EVOLUTION IN CREATIVE THINKING 76-77
(1964).
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prescribed curricula and we need to exercise more effort to
appraise and credit growth resulting from the student's own initi-
ative."15 7 Encouraging and crediting self-initiated learning frees
students to learn things which they are anxious to know and
which they find exciting. "Generally, graduate students are too
afraid to learn the things that are important to them for fear they
will not learn all that they will be graded on."' 58 As much as pos-
sible we should allow students to exercise their own initiative for
their learning, to develop their own judgment.
Research papers are one way in which law students in the
second and third years are encouraged to learn the material on
their own and develop their own judgments and insights. Other
approaches are possible; not every course in the second and third
year curriculum needs to be taught by the traditional Socratic
method. One suggestion is to have students share with teachers
in the decision-making about courses, on both the content and
manner of evaluation. This approach has been tried successfully
in undergraduate courses and could hold greatest promise in sem-
inars. In some college classes, students are allowed to make "con-
tracts" with their instructor. For example, in a course where the
professor gives three examinations and requires a paper, the stu-
dent could assign any weight to the requirement as he desires; he
might decide he would benefit more from doing an intensive
paper, assign a weight of 70 percent to it and contract that each
examination will be 10 per cent of his final grade. Because of the
sheer number of students any attempt to individualize "contracts"
would work better in smaller sections. In some small way, the
student is allowed to place an emphasis where the student feels
she will best benefit.
Other more individualized contracts are possible, to the point
of allowing the student a voice in the material she will read for a
course and the number of papers she will write. For example, a
student could decide he would prefer to read from a selected list on
different topics and write critical summaries of the material he
has digested; this approach follows independent study programs
of undergraduate schools. While the number of law students per
professor would limit the use of this approach, it could be more
frequently used than at the present time. Further, research
allows students to learn subjects deeply enough so that they have
157. Id.
158. Id.
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the requisite knowledge to competently toy with the materials and
restructure them.'59 To this end, mini-courses or shortened semi-
nars could be given, at the end of which a long research paper
would be written. Nothing is sacrosanct about having a seminar
meet 14 times a semester for two hours a session. The seminar
could meet for eight weeks, after which the student would prepare
a research paper of greater depth than the usual seminar paper.
Many approaches could be tried in the second and third year to
allow the student to exercise greater flexibility and initiative.
Such self-initiated learning facilitates creative responses: self-
activity encourages students to explore, to experiment and
hypothesize. It maintains the spontaneous, self-starting quality
of learning and keeps the motivational forces for learning within
the individual learner.160 It gives the person a chance "to proceed
at his own pace, to cogitate on the issues in his own way, to play
with his own ideas in his own fashion." 16 1
A more direct attempt to reawaken the creative potential of
law students was undertaken by Buffalo Law School. A New York
attorney, Gordon MacLeod, started an eight-week, no credit
course at the law school on creative problem-solving. 162 The
results were favorable. Eleven of the 19 students returning ques-
tionnaires said it should be a required course either in college or
the first year of law school. 163 The practitioner spends large por-
tions of his time thinking of practical ways for the client to avoid
legal problems. For this reason, MacLeod believed that the lawyer
who can use his imagination to come up with the greatest number
of ideas for possible solutions is, after using his critical judgment,
most likely to come up with the best final answer to the problem.
In their answers to the questionnaires, all the students saw some
relationship between the class and the study and practice of law.
In fact, in the experimental group taking the course, the grades of
13 out of 20 improved, while in the control group eight out of 20
159. The suggestion of several psychologists is that one has to know his subject
well in order to be creative. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 34, at 420; CREATIITY,
supra note 24, at 28; HENLE, supra note 154 at 43 ("Our creative thinking tends
to be in fields and in relation to problems that we know a good deal about.").
160. Hallman, supra note 44, at 327. Hallman states that self-initiated
learning is indispensable in inducing creative responses.
161. GET=ZLs & JACKSON, supra note 15, at 132 (1962).
162. For a full analysis of his study see MacLeod, supra note 134.
163. Id. at 201.
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improved. 164 The questionnaire also indicated that the course has
helped the students outside the area of the law. Sixteen found the
concepts somewhat helpful or very helpful in life's activities in
general. Eighteen felt the course had developed their creativity to
some extent; and most of the students stated their attitudes, self-
confidence and sensitivity to problems had been improved. 1 5
Courses in creative problem-solving have been conducted with
other types of students, with significant effects. A study by
Parnes and Meadow in 1960 has shown that the effects produced
by such a course persist, at least from eight months to four years
after the course. 166 While such a course is beneficial, the effects
apparently dissipate with time, unless other environmental condi-
tions facilitate creative growth. What, then, are the long term
effects of law school on one's creative processes? Do the effects
last, and do they carry over into the attorney's creative process in
general, and if so, what is the loss to the self?
Arguably, in some respects the effects of three years in law
school on one's capacity for the imaginative may be short-lived.
From the standpoint of creativity, the law school is primarily a
threatening experience. After one graduates, however, the fears
of being stripped intellectually by the Socratic method are gone,
the intense competition and threat of examinations are pleasantly
past, and the graduate can turn his attention to his profession. If
law school was an unpleasant experience (and few seem to enjoy
it), the graduate has the sweet victory of knowing he has sur-
vived 6 7 and need never return. Whether the law school experi-
ence only temporarily affects creative functioning may be difficult
to determine; the effects of the educational process in hampering
creative functioning probably start in kindergarten, and these
164. Id. at 202. I cite these figures only to raise the question of whether
increasing creativity affects grades. MacLeod's study is not extensive enough to
be of any real benefit on the question; also, he does not state how much grades
increased, whether the increase was substantial or very slight.
165. Id. at 201.
166. CREATIVITY, supra note 24, at 124.
167. See William T. Braithwaite, Hearts and Minds, 76 A.B.A. J. 70, 73 (Sept.
1990) ("Too much of law school as presently constituted encourages a survival
instinct rather than a yearning for genuine education. This does not conduce to
professionalism.").
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effects are cumulative. 16s Few survive through graduate pro-
grams in most fields with creativity in tact.
But is seems likely that in one's professional role, the toll that
a legal education takes on creative functioning does last, simply
because in the attorney's every waking moment she is indoctri-
nated with (and buys) the theory that the attorney's intellect and
emotion should be isolated from each other. The indoctrination
into "thinking like an attorney" starts in law school and becomes a
part of the very fiber of the attorney in her professional life. In
her every waking moment, the attorney will strive to separate the
head from the heart so that no one can berate her for, God forbid,
not "thinking like an attorney." I cringe when I hear that mean-
ingless phrase. The point is that we have accepted the indoctrina-
tion and think that we are members of a select intellectual club,
and that our hearts are, and should be, separated from our intel-
lect. Creativity is not likely to flourish in such an atmosphere.
In his professional life, the attorney continually criticizes,
edits, picks apart, rejects and constantly evaluates. Due to the
emphasis on being rational, the attorney divorces emotion from
the logical thought processes and assumes they are incapable of
coexistence. This approach is likely to detrimentally affect the
lawyer in all his creative endeavors, whether in the professional
role or as a novelist. In law, the critical judgment is exercised too
quickly without giving the imagination its freedom. While an
attorney's clinical, surgical approach may be very beneficial in the
secondary stage of creativity, it blocks the primary stage from
functioning properly. In a similar way, the division of emotion
and thought deprives one from a total awareness of any situation
and is not conducive to creativity.' 69 Griswold argues that by
sanctifying purely logical reasoning we "are not giving sufficient
weight to other elements in the situation which are equally rele-
vant in any truly intellectual evaluation."'7 0 The creative person
tends to use all his senses in gathering data, in playing with con-
structs and trying out new approaches. The blocking of emotional
sensitivity curbs this process.
As a result of the law school experience, as well as the subse-
quent interaction with attorneys after graduation, the neophyte's
168. The forces of higher education that inhibit and facilitate the development
and expression of creativity appear to be cumulative. CREATMrTY, supra note 24,
at 125.
169. Id. at 137.
170. Griswold, supra note 36, at 300.
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indoctrination into the legal profession is likely to take a perma-
nent toll not only on creative functioning but also on other aspects
of one's life. According to Aristotle, "the most virtuous human
being feels passions, pleasures and pains 'at the right times, with
reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the
right motive, and in the right way.'"' 7 ' But in law our indoctrina-
tion into our secret cult is that we should not "feel," and I am con-
cerned about how this mind-bending affects our functioning as
attorneys and as human beings. I do not see how beings can be
virtuous when they have lost the capacity to feel.
A recurrent theme of the sociology of occupations is that a
man's work affects his outlook on life. 172 Legal instruction teaches
students to exercise rational, critical judgment and exalt logic
over other values, such as emotional sensitivity. 73 These atti-
tudes are so deeply embedded by three years of law school and
reaffirmed by the attorney's every professional day that they are
not likely to be severed. Stone, Kennedy and Savoy are among
those who argue that legal education "is an important socializa-
tion experience which can have long-term effects on the personal-
ity, the attitudes, and the values of those who are exposed to it."' 74
In his book, The Legal Imagination,7 5 James White quotes a
passage from Mark Twain's Life on the Mississippi, in which the
narrator describes how years of being a river pilot had changed
the way he defined himself and the way he "saw" the river.
Although as a pilot, Twain learned every "trifling feature" and
secret that the river holds, he had also been diminished: "I had
made a valuable acquisition. But I had lost something, too. I had
lost something which could never be restored to me while I lived.
All the grace, the beauty, the poetry had gone from the majestic
river!" 7 ' White suggests that learning to speak and think like a
171. Braithwaite, supra note 167, at 73 (quoting ARmsTOTLE, NiCHOMACHEAN
ETms 43 (Martin Ostwald ed. & trans., 1962)).
172. See EvERE7- CHERRINGTON HOUGHES, MEN AND THEm WoRK 42-55 (1958).
173. See Griswold, supra note 36, at 300.
174. Stone, supra note 34, at 422. Stone reiterates the assumption of such
critics of legal education as Kennedy and Savoy that legal training has long term
effects on personality. Stone shares in the assumption, although he points out
"it, has never been adequately proven in any empirical sense and, thus,
represents no more than a sophisticated psychological formulation confirmed in a
n impressionistic and intuitive fashion." Id. at 422, n. 109.
175. JA~Ms WmTE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
176. See id. at 11 (quoting MARK TwAiN, LiFE ON THE MIssissippi 65 (John
Seelye ed. 1990) (1883)).
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lawyer similarly entails both a gain and a loss, that the romance
and beauty are gone from the river, and that a legal education
causes similar changes, and dangers, in the way one defines him-
self. After one trains to see the world through the lenses of an
attorney, White implies that at the end of a day or year or a dec-
ade of such a professional life, one could simply go home and be
the same old fellow one always was. 177 "Certainly you are differ-
ent from the person who came to law school not so long ago, and
very different indeed from people who have never been to law
school. You may find it disturbing, or elating, but your experience
of education, if it is anything at all, must be an experience of
change. "178
One law student who was elated by the changes in her life
noted, "My interactions with strangers became couched in terms
of potential torts, breaches of contract, or infringements of consti-
tutional rights."'7 9 Another individual, Professor David Richards,
also noted that changes occur: "Certainly, professional education
transforms the identities of our students: a student in my first-
year law classes is a different person than the one I teach as a
third-year student."8 0 Professor Richards argues that some of
these changes are benign, and others, malignant. One malignant
form is "the psychology of the Watergate lawyers for whom profes-
sionalism meant ultimate team loyalty at the expense of clear eth-
ical obligation."' 8 ' The psychology of the Watergate lawyers is not
in principle different from the psychology of many American law-
yers for whom legal education has meant mastery of an autono-
mous body of law and identification with a profession that strives
to be cold and impersonal.182 For in truth, "ethical behavior is
much more of an emotional than a rational matter," 1 3 and by
striving to be impersonal, we strive to kick the daylights out of our
sense of morality. "[Professionalism means not detached and
coldly impersonal and vacuous alienation, but the more... power-
ful fulfillment of one's moral nature and satisfaction of the appe-
tite in life for meaning and significant service."184
177. Id. at 21.
178. Id. at 43.
179. Uhlig, supra note 68, at 616.
180. David A. J. Richards, Moral Theory, the Development Psychology of
Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359, 361 (1981).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Boyer & Cramton, supra note 71, at 268.
184. Richards, supra note 180, at 361.
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The changes that occur through legal education and assimila-
tion into the profession affect not only creativity but all aspects of
one's life. In reading numerous articles on legal education, this
reader has been struck by the number of times authors have con-
sidered the effects of legal education on the quality of life. Psy-
chologists have noted the effects of repressing creative awareness:
"[S]cattered evidence from a variety of sources leaves little ques-
tion but that the stifling of creative desires and abilities cuts at
the very roots of satisfaction in living and ultimately creates over-
whelming tension and breakdown." 18 5 Law students generally
have taken a broader view, expressing distress "by what becoming
an attorney does to their personal lives and relationships with
people outside their chosen profession." 186
Legal education may fair no better with students outside the
law schools. At a conference on Education Reform at Dartmouth
College in 1967, Savoy discovered the "feeling shared by many
students that law schools are places where old men in their twen-
ties go to die."18 7 Legal institutions were seen as the deep-freeze
of the emotional life of the university. 188 In the introduction to the
Harvard Law Review, volume 84, the editors to the Review suc-
cinctly capture similar concerns. The editors comment that on
Sunday mornings hundreds of young people gather in the Cam-
bridge Commons. "A band plays,... sailing frisbees define the
perimeter of the group."" 9 In the law school, work proceeds as
usual. "An editor and an author dispute the most effective way of
countering a troublesome argument, drop it to a note or meet it
head on in text? A quick glance at the Sunday Times; a cold Pepsi
at eleven in the morning; a glance out the window into the Com-
mons, and back to work."190 For the editors, Cambridge Sundays
will never be the same and represent a deeply disturbing realiza-
tion of the gulf between life and law. The eight to ten years in
which a young person attends law school and makes his or her
way into partnership ranks of a firms are "years of intense and
virtually exclusive involvement in acquiring the lawyer's skills of
rationality and judgment."' 9' The editors acknowledge that they
185. CREATIviTY, supra note 24, at 52.
186. Mohr & Rodgers, supra note 6, at 405.
187. Savoy, supra note 3, at 462.
188. Id. at 462.
189. WHITE, supra note 175, at 41.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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would probably not abandon their intense way of life for a home on
the Commons, but they are deeply concerned by the sacrifices
inherent in a diligent apprenticeship:
[Few] believe that the slow seepage of personal vibrancy which fol-
lows from single-minded devotion to legal studies is worth
whatever additional skills may be exercisable upon "arrival" at the
unknown point of aspiration. Not only is there no sharp vision of
reintegration to sustain us, but we also wonder whether it will
every be possible fully to reawaken our aesthetic and emotional
dimensions after they have fallen into disuse during the long
period of legal development.1 92
The authors question how to "explain to newly chosen editors why
they must become library fixtures at age of twenty-two."193 Enter-
ing classes to law school are told of the rigorous, exacting and
uncompromising demands law will make on their lives during the
three years of law study. Usually the demands last much longer,
as the Harvard editors note. The adage that the law is a jealous
mistress hits dead center.
A great deal is gained and many benefits inhere in the study
of law, but it also exacts a price - in time and in closing off and
deadening certain parts of the personality and in destroying cer-
tain values:
[L]aw school teaches students to deal with every conceivable loss,
that of an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife - everyone, that is, but
the most important, the loss of one's self, which may pass off as
quietly as if it were nothing .... 194
In a passage that is appropriate to lawyers, Mark Twain, in Life
on the Mississippi, muses about the education of a river boat pilot:
"And doesn't he sometimes wonder whether he has gained or lost
most by learning his trade?" 195
192. Id.
193. Id. at 42.
194. Savoy, supra note 3, at 502 (passage adapted from SOREN KiERKEGAARD,
THE SicKNEss UNTo DEATH (Walter Lowrie ed. & trans. 1954)).
195. MARK TwAiN, LIFE ON THE MIssissippi 66 (John Seelye ed. 1990) (1883).
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